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GOOD FAITH, REASONABLENESS - AND THE
LESSON OF MARYLAND v. GARRISON: KNOW THY
NEIGHBOR
INTRODUCTION
"The good-faith exception to the warrant requirement was stretched so
far in Maryland v. Garrison ... that it may never snap back."' The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that a search warrant, although
it turned out to be overbroad when executed, was valid when issued. 2 Police
officers executed a search warrant for the premises of Lawrence McWebb,
located on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue,' but mistakenly searched
both McWebb's apartment, the intended target of the warrant, and that of
his neighbor, Garrison. 4 The Court stated that since the police believed in
good faith that McWebb's apartment was the only apartment located on the
third floor, the search of Garrison's apartment, also located on the third
floor, was reasonable.5 Therefore, the evidence found in Garrison's apart-
ment was not suppressed. 6 The Garrison Court essentially diluted the spec-
ificity requirement of the search warrant, and used "good faith mistake" to
justify the warrantless entry and search of Garrison's apartment.
Technically, the good faith exception to the warrant requirement recog-
nized by the Garrison Court cannot be sustained under United States v.
Leon7 or Massachusetts v. Sheppard,' two cases which represent the Court's
official adoption of a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.9 The
1. Bernstein, Search & Seizure, 23 TRIAL 90 (June 1987).
2. Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1018 (1987). "There is no question that the
warrant was valid and was supported by probable cause." Id. at 1015.
3. Id. at 1015. "The search warrant which was issued authorized the police to search for
marijuana and related materials 'on the person [and] on the premises [of] Lawrence Meril
McWebb, [at] 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment described as being a three story brick
dwelling with the numerals 2-0-3-6 affixed to the front of same."' Garrison v. State, 303 Md.
385, 387, 494 A.2d 193, 194 (1985).
4. Garrison v. State, 58 Md. App. 417, 473 A.2d 514 (Md. App. 1984).
5. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1019.
6. Id. at 1020.
7. 468 U.S. 897, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984).
8. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
9. For commentary on the Leon doctrine, see Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government
Work". The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. Rev. 309; Bacigal, An Alternative
Approach to the Good Faith Controversy, 37 MERCER L. REv. 957 (1986); Dripps, Living with
Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986); Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold:
But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. Cam. L. REv. 85 (1984); Comment, Blessed are the Faithful:
An Analysis of the Scope and Applicability of the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 15 U. BALT. L. REv. 496 (1986).
518 DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:517
exception established in those cases concerns a police officer's reliance on a
facially valid warrant that is later determined to be invalid due to insufficient
facts establishing probable cause" or because the warrant is technically
insufficient." However, much of the language in Garrison indicates that this
decision was based upon the principles which formed the basis for the Leon
and Sheppard decisions: the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence
of police misconduct, and this purpose is not served when police officers in
good faith believe that they are in compliance with the Constitution.'2
Since its inception in Weeks v. United States, 11 the exclusionary rule, which
prohibits the use of evidence seized as a result of a fourth amendment
violation, has been an issue of heated debate within the Court. 4 The executive
branch, through the Attorney General, has advocated limiting the exclusion-
ary rule in order to get tough on crime." The benefits and detriments of
the rule have been discussed at length within the legislative halls16 and among
numerous commentators and scholars. 7 Although labeled a "judicially cre-
10. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
11. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990-91. "This case involves the application of the rules [in Leon]
to a situation in which police officers seize items pursuant to a warrant subsequently invalidated
because of a technical error on the part of the issuing judge." Id. at 983-84.
12. Justice White limited the good faith in Leon to reliance on a warrant that is later held
to be invalid due to lack of probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. In Sheppard, however, he
limited the good faith to reliance on a warrant later held invalid because of a technical
insufficiency. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990-91. His concurrence in Gates suggested that evidence
should not be suppressed in any case where police officers reasonably believed that their conduct
was in compliance with the fourth amendment. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255, reh'g
denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. For one of the most comprehensive attacks on the exclusionary rule, see Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (describing rule as "both conceptually sterile
and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective"). But see Stewart, The Road
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule
in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1383-84 (1983) (defending rule as a
constitutionally required remedy: "The proscription and guarantees in the amendments were
intended to create legal rights and duties.").
15. See, e.g., 1981 ArroREY GEsNEuj's TASK FoRcE o VIOLENT CIWAMS, FINL REP. 55
("[E]vidence should not be excluded from a criminal proceeding if it has been obtained by an
officer acting in the reasonable, good-faith belief that it was in conformity to the Fourth
Amendment.").
16. The Exclusionary Rule Bills: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
17. See generally Kamisar, Is the Excluslonary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JuDicATuRB 66, 67 & 84 (1978) (exclusionary rule is
necessary to give effect to the fourth amendment, and "imperative of judicial integrity" requires
that a bright line be drawn between constitutional and unconstitutional behavior (citing Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960))); Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1272 (1983) ("the Court has failed to recognize
the exclusionary rule as a device for protecting the innocent," since only the guilty benefit
from its direct application; "[c]onsequently the rule has been restricted so much that it fails to
offer innocent citizens the protection to which they should be entitled. . ."); McGarr, The
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ated remedy" by the Court,"s the exclusionary rule has also been affirmed
as an essential part of the fourth amendment. 9 The rule has undergone a
drastic transformation in the last decade and may well become an obsolete
doctrine.
This Casenote will trace the development of fourth amendment constitu-
tional law as it pertains to areas and interests protected by the warrant
requirement, and the special protection courts have historically given to the
home. The development of the exclusionary rule, as well as the exceptions
the Court has designed to restrict its application, will also be presented. This
Casenote will then examine the facts and issues of Garrison and show how
the Court ignored other possible grounds for allowing the conviction against
Garrison, in favor of relaxing the specificity requirement of the search
warrant, and allowing a warrantless entry and search of a home under the
rubric of "good faith mistake."
I. BACKGROUND
The fourth amendment" was placed in the Bill of Rights by the Framers,
largely as a result of American pre-revolutionary struggles with England,
Exclusionary Rule: An Ill Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. Clum. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
PoL. Sc. 266, 268 (1961) (concluding that exclusionary rule is "a piece of pure judicial
legislating" aimed at achieving a social goal, and that rule punishes society as a whole whenever
a police officer acts unconstitutionally); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception
to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365,
373 (1981) (rule Is necessary for systemic deterrence and opponents of exclusion "should not
mask their objection to an interpretation of the fourth amendment as an attack on the
exclusionary rule"); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requirement, 59 MiNN. L. REv. 251 (1974) (rule is necessary to enforce two
principles: 1) to promote and ensure respect for the security of person and property; and, 2)
discouraging "executive misconduct" by exclusion); Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and
the Exclusionary Rule, 71 J. C um. L. & CAMIN0oLOGY 343, 376 (1980) (exclusion is product of
due process and is "natural consequence" of judicial review, therefore, rule is an issue of
"constitutional magnitude" which should not be frought with partisanship); White, Forgotten
Points In the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MIcH. L. Rav. 1273 (1983) (discusses historical
property aspects of origin of Weeks); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid
Evidence?, 62 JuDicATuRE 214, 223 (1978) (argues that "the rule in its indiscriminate workings
does far more harm than good and, in many respects, it actually prevents us from dealing with
the real problems of Fourth Amendment violations . . . "); Wright, Must the Criminal Go
Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 Tax. L. REv. 736, 737 (1972) (since exclusionary rule is
only applicable after a search and seizure has brought out evidence of a crime, rule benefits
only the guilty).
18. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("[T]he rule is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights."). See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 28 (1949) (exclusionary rule "was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth
Amendment .... The decision was a matter of judicial implication.").
19. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court held the exclusionary rule applicable
against the states. Id. at 655. The Court reasoned that if it were to hold otherwise, the fourth
amendment's rights and assurances against unreasonable searches and seizures would be "val-
ueless." Id.
20. The fourth amendment guarantees that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
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and the use of general warrants and writs of assistance.2' The amendment
is short and ambiguous. It gives no definition of the word "unreasonable,"
does not clearly establish the relationship between the unreasonable searches
and seizures clause and the warrant clause, and is silent as to what remedy,
if any, should be used to address violations.22 Substantive law under the
fourth amendment developed slowly as it remained "unexplored territory"
for almost a century," until Boyd v. United States" in 1886. The Court
slowly handed down decisions defining the fourth amendment, as well as
developing a remedy for its violations.Y The flurry of activity on fourth
amendment law which dominated the Warren Court 6 is largely responsible
for the present understanding of the amendment, which continues to be
redefined .27
A. Protection Of The Home
Although the analysis used in determining what is protected by the fourth
amendment has changed, the one constant principle has been that the
protection given the home is paramount.2 This section will focus primarily
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
21. See Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J.
Cand. L., CRINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 246, 249-50 (1961); Bloom, Warrant Requirement-The
Burger Court Approach, 53 U. COLO. L. Rav. 691, 694-96 (1982); Lewis, An Instrument of
the New Constitution: The Origins of the General Warrant, 7 J. LEGAL HIST. 256 (1986). Courts
have often discussed the historical motivation for the Framers in their fourth amendment
adjudication. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980) (indiscriminate searches
pursuant to general warrants were primary reasons for adoption of the fourth amendment);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("It is familiar history that indiscriminate
searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants' were the immediate
evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment."); United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972) (explaining that historical struggle
between England and the Colonies centered on issues of searches and seizures, as well as on
freedoms of speech and the press). In United States v. United States Dist. Court, Justice
Douglas stated, "it was such excesses as the use of general warrants and the writs of assistance
that led to the ratification of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 327 (Douglas, J., concurring).
22. 1 W. LAFAvB, SEARCH & StizuRE: A TRA~sSE ON THE FouRmr AmND, mtT 5-7 (2d
ed. 1987).
23. J. LANDYNSIG, SEARCH & SEIzuRE AND THE SuPaEmE COURT 42 (1966).
24. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Court established a link between the fourth and fifth
amendments by holding compulsory production of documents as a search and seizure. Id. at
621-23.
25. See Allen, supra note 21, at 246-50; Comment, United States v. Leon: Fourth Amend-
ment Rights Eroded to Pre-Constitutional Status, 20 NEw. ENO. L. REv. 317, 327-33 (1984).
26. Cf. Harris, The Return to Common Sense: A Response to "The Incredible Shrinking
Fourth Amendment, " 22 AM. Cams. L. REv. 25 (1984) (describing fourth amendment decisions
during the Warren Court as "excesses").
27. See infra notes 144-206 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 47.
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on how the warrant protects this interest, particularly through its specificity
requirement.29
1. The Katz expectation of privacy test
An examination of fourth amendment law should begin with the under-
standing that "searches and seizures" are words of limitation. 0 Police are
not required by the fourth amendment to be reasonable unless their actions
are categorized as "searches or seizures."3 The Court has defined the term
"seizure" to apply to situations where there is "some meaningful interfer-
ence" with a person's possessory interests. 32 As to the former term, during
the pre-Katz era, a search was defined as a physical intrusion into a "con-
stitutionally protected area.''" The landmark decision of Katz v. United
States34 re-defined the law of search and seizure when the Court held that
the fourth amendment "protects people, not places." 3
In Katz, the defendant was convicted in federal court of transmitting
wagering information through a public telephone.16 The evidence used to
sustain the conviction was obtained by an electronic listening and recording
device attached to the outside of a telephone booth Katz used to transmit
the wagering information. 3" The Court overruled Olmstead v. United States"
and Goldman v. United States" and held that the fourth amendment not
29. See infra note 68.
30. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. Ra,. 349, 356 (1974).
See generally United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (fourth amendment's
protection limits only government action); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 757-58 (1979)
(fourth amendment protects privacy in essentially two ways: 1) it guarantees citizens that they
will not be subject to unreasonable searches and seizures by the government; and, 2) searches
and seizures are normally conducted pursuant to a warrant and in compliance with its require-
ments); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (whether or not a particular intrusion is
permissible depends on result of balancing "intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests").
31. Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 356. E.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54
("essential purpose" of the fourth amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon
any governmental intrusions into the privacy of citizens).
32. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. at 653 (stopping and detaining automobile, even for brief period, constitutes a "seizure");
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (whenever police officer impairs another's freedom to walk
away, that person has been "seized").
33. Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 357. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
509-10 (1961) (Court held that attaching electronic listening device to heating duct constituted
violation of the fourth amendment and suppressed conversations overheard by police); Goldman
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942) (use of detectaphone placed against outside wall
in order to hear conversations held to be not violative of the fourth amendment).
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. Id. at 351.
36. Id. at 348.
37. Id.
38. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
39. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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only governs the seizure of tangible items, but also protects the recording
of oral statements.40 The Court asserted that once this is recognized, it is
clear that the protection of the fourth amendment cannot depend upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion. 4' Justice Harlan concurred with
the result, but reasoned that the protection of the fourth amendment is
measured by reference to a place, and set forth two requirements which
must be satisfied. 4 According to Justice Harlan, it should first be determined
whether a person has exhibited an actual subjectiye expectation of privacy,
and if so, whether that expectation is one which society would accept as
reasonable. 43 This is the approach taken by the lower courts attempting to
apply Katz," as well as by the majority of the Court.4
However, even prior to Katz, the home enjoyed constitutional protection.' 6
With the Katz expectation of privacy test, the special protection afforded
homes arguably remains intact, since society recognizes the home as a place
one can reasonably expect privacy.4 7 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority
in Payton v. New York,48 stressed that since the home has always been
regarded as an "especially private place," it deserves special protection
40. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (Sth Cir.) (holding that
defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy when their conversations were being
overheard by unaided ears of police in adjoining room), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979);
United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (court, reversing conviction of
defendant, held that "a transient visitor retains his expectation of privacy, and it makes little
difference whether his belonging is being personally held by him or has been set down
temporarily," (citing United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1973))).
45. See Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT.
REv. 133. Accord California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-15 (1986) (using Katz's two-part
analysis, Court held that the "naked eye" observation of defendant's backyard from airplane,
which revealed marijuana, did not violate fourth amendment since such an expectation of
privacy would be unreasonable); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (search
occurs "when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed"); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) ("Since [Katz], the touchstone
of [fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question of whether a person has a 'constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy' which is not only based on subjective expectation,
but also on what is recognized as reasonable by society); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287
(1983) (Court held that reasonable expectation of privacy in fire damaged property may be
reasonably recognized).
46. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 ("At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
47. See generally Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3173 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (home is "the place that traditionally has been regarded as the center of a person's
private life, the bastion in which one has a legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment."); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)
(Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that "physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.").
48. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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against unreasonable searches and seizures.4 9 This protection is generally in
the form of a stern adherence to the requirement of a valid search warrant,
and labeling warrantless entries as per se unreasonable.5 0
Evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless entry will not be suppressed if
there has been a voluntary consent s.5  In addition, evidence will not be
suppressed if the police have entered in "hot pursuit ' 52 or under exigent
circumstances to protect the loss of life or evidence. 3 The Court has prom-
ulgated these "carefully drawn" exceptions whenever the societal costs of
obtaining a warrant have been held to outweigh the privacy interest of the
individual. 54
2. The warrant requirement
In Katz, the Court proclaimed that warrantless searches are per se unrea-
sonable under the fourth amendment, subject only to a few "specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions."" Although the Court has since
allowed a number of exceptions to the pre-search warrant requirement, 6 the
49. Id. at 589-90. The Court held that in order to arrest an individual in his own home,
the police must obtain an arrest warrant, absent exigent circumstances, since "the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house." Id. at 590.
50. Bogdanos, Search and Seizure: A Reasoned Approach, 6 PACE L. REv. 543, 554 (1986)
(discussing dramatic changes in fourth amendment law, author asserts that "there is a valid
argument that the 'per se unreasonableness of warrantless searches' sentiment which received
its greatest voice in Coolidge [403 U.S. 443 (1971) has been transformed ever so adroitly into
the current view that only those warrantless searches that are of houses are perse unreasonable").
See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 590 ("Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold
[the home) may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."); Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 211 (1981) ("Except in such special situations [consent or exigent circumstances], we
have consistently held that the entry into a home to conduct a search or make an arrest is
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant."). But cf.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3171 (holding that "special needs" of probation system
allowed for warrantless search of probationer's home pursuant to a regulation providing for
such, and is thus reasonable under the fourth amendment).
51. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that when suspect is not in
custody, the state has burden of proving consent, and this is judged from a totality of the
circumstances, based on objective facts).
52. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (upholding search throughout house as valid
since the "exigency" of the situation was the hot pursuit of suspect, and distiction between
"mere evidence" and fruits or instrumentalities was eliminated).
53. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (characterizing withdrawal of blood at
request of police officer, which resulted in a conviction for driving while intoxicated, as exigent
circumstance to save the destruction of evidence).
54. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979).
55. 389 U.S. at 357.
56. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) ("plain view" doctrine allowing for seizure of objects in plain
view if officer has legal access to item, has probable cause to believe item is connected to
crime, and access is inadvertent); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970) (exigent
circumstances); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (listing exceptions to warrant requirement);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 294 (1966) (exigent circumstances existed where blood was removed for
evidence of intoxication); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile exception).
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Court adheres to a general preference for with-warrant searches."
A search warrant is not merely a formality, but rather, serves the "high
function" of placing the judgment of a magistrate between the public and
law enforcement officials.5" The warrant clause 9 sets forth three criteria that
must be satisfied before a warrant is issued: (1) probable cause to be deter-
mined by a neutral and detached magistrate; 60 (2) supported by oath or
affirmation; 6' and, (3) a sufficiently particular description of the items to be
seized or the place to be searched. 62 Thus, the warrant requirement provides
for protection through two distinct limitations. First, any searches or seizures
must be supported by probable cause." Second, even if probable cause exists,
the specificity requirement will limit the search to prevent a "general ex-
ploratory rummaging" through an individual's property.M
57. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979) ("In the ordinary case, therefore, a
search of private property must be both reasonable and pursuant to a properly issued search
warrant; the mere reasonableness of a search . . is not a substitute for the judicial warrant
required under the Fourth Amendment."); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)
(rejecting "murder scene exception" created by Arizona, Court stressed that the fourth amend-
ment "proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle" that
searches are per se unreasonable absent a warrant or well-delineated exceptions); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) ("Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is
concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a
warrant."). But see Bloom, The Supreme Court and Its Purported Preference for Search
Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REv. 231 (1983) (criticizes Court for not following original justifications
when creating exceptions to warrant requirement).
In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984), the Court held that transferring an
unmonitored beeper hidden in a can of ether from a DEA agent to defendant does not constitute
a search or seizure, however, the Court stated that "warrants for the installation and monitoring
of a beeper will obviously be desirable .... Id. at 713 n.3.
58. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). See also United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 332 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The Warrant Clause
has stood as a barrier against intrusions by officialdom into the privacies of life.").
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and parti-
culary describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be searched."
60. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (magistrate must be neutral and
detached and capable of determining "whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest
or search"); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 450-53 (holding invalid warrant issued by the state's attorney
general, since such executive officer is not neutral and detached).
61. See, e.g., Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224, 1228 (1971) (court found warrant was
issued in violation of fourth amendment since police officer's testimony not given under "oath
or affirmation"). See generally 1 W.R. LAFAvE, J.H. ISRAEL, CRMNAL PRocEDuRE 3.4(c)
(1984).
62. See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
63. United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. $10,000
In U.S. Currency, 780 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1986) ("A search warrant must be obtained for
incriminating evidence which the government believes will be found and for which it has
probable cause."). See generally Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) ("the warrant
procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions" upon citizens' privacy interests).
64. Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1256.
19891 MARYLAND v. GARRISON 525
3. Particularity of description
The fourth amendment expressly requires that no warrants shall issue
except those "particularly describing the place to be searched." 65 This re-
quirement has a two-fold purpose. First, it compels the executing officer to
pinpoint the place to be searched, or the items to be seized, thus limiting
the scope of the search." Second, it bolsters the necessary showing of
probable cause6 by demonstrating that there is reason to believe that the
items are to be found in the specified place."
Generally, as the Court stated in Steele v. United States,69 the description
is sufficient if the executing officer can reasonably identify the place to be
searched. 70 The description should preclude the mistaken search of another
residence. 7' No formal requirements as to the specificity of the location are
65. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. For an interesting analysis of the warrant clause, see Bloom,
supra note 21; Note, Criminal Law In the Ninth Circuit: Recent Developments, 15 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 431, 438 (1982).
66. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) ("When an official search is properly
authorized-whether by consent or by the issuance of a valid warrant-the scope of the search
is limited by the terms of its authorization.").
67. The cases of Aguilar v. Texas, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Spinelli v. United States, 378
U.S. 108 (1964) provided a working formula for establishing probable cause in an affidavit for
a warrant. The two-pronged test required that the affidavit: (1) set forth the facts to support
the validity of the conclusion that the materials sought are located where the source claims,
and; (2) set forth information establishing the veracity and reliability of the source. This test
was rejected as too technical and limiting, and was subsequently replaced by a "totality of the
circumstances test" in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The two prongs thus became items
to be considered in the overall set of circumstances. See generally United States v. Strauss, 678
F.2d 886, 892 (1 1th Cir. 1982) ("Probable cause exists if facts within the magistrate's knowledge
and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that a crime was committed and that evidence is at the place to be
searched."); United States v. Freeman, 532 F.2d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir. 1976) (probable cause is
based on "the probability, and not 'a prima facie showing of criminal activity" with due
deference given to issuing magistrate).
68. See United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 754 (11th Cir.) (search warrant can only
be issued if there is probable cause to believe that offense has been committed and that evidence
of such exists at place to be searched), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076 (1984); United States v.
McKinney, 758 F.2d 1036, 1043 (5th Cir. 1985) (nexus between items sought to be seized and
place to be searched may be established by direct observation or inferences as to where items
may be located); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 759 (2d Cir. 1984) (particularity
requirement serves three purposes, which are "preventing general searches, preventing the
seizure of objects upon the mistaken assumption that they fall within the magistrate's author-
ization, and preventing the issuance of warrants without a substantial factual basis").
69. 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
70. Id. at 503.
71. See Betancourt, 734 F.2d at 754-65 ("Elaborate specificity is unnecessary" as long as
executing officer can reasonably ascertain premises to be searched); United States v. Gitcho,
601 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[W]hether the place to be searched is described with
sufficient particularity as to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises
with reasonable effort and whether there is any reasonable probability that another premise
might be mistakenly searched."); United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1313-14 (8th Cir.
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necessary, since this is judged on a case-by-case basis. 2 Even if the description
contained in the warrant is not sufficient, courts have allowed this deficiency
to be "cured" in one of two ways: if documents attached to the warrant
provide additional information and aid in the description," or if the executing
officer has been to the location previously and can supplement the deficiency
in the warrant by personal knowledge . 4
It has been argued that the specificity requirement should be even more
stringent when the premises to be searched involve an apartment in a multi-
unit structure.73 As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his Garrison dissent,
"such forms of habitation are now common in this country, particularly in
neighborhoods with changing populations and of declining affluence.' 6 The
general rule is that a search warrant directed at a unit in a multi-unit
structure will be held invalid if the warrant fails to describe the targeted unit
with sufficient definiteness to preclude the search of other units within the
structure." However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule. For
example, even if the warrant would normally be deficient as to the description
requirement, the search will still be upheld if enough information guides the
1976) (standard is "practical accuracy rather than technical nicety" whi:h requires that nothing
be left to discretion of police officer executing warrant). See generally United States v. Burke,
784 F.2d 1090, 1092 (lth Cir. 1986) ("A warrant's description of the place to be searched is
not required to meet technical requirements or have the specificity sought by conveyancers.").
72. See, e.g., Luster v. State, 433 So.2d 481, 484 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (warrant sufficient
when only name of occupant and detailed description of how to get to premises was disclosed);
People v. Kissinger, 26 I11. App. 3d 260, 263, 325 N.E.2d 28, 30-31 (1975) (although warrant
did not contain name of the city, street number, street name and county were given and thus,
in light of fact that county only had one street by the given name, warrant was sufficient);
Pool v. State, 483 So.2d 331 (Miss. 1986) (physical description of house trailer and directions
on how to get there were sufficient).
73. E.g., United States v. Cantu, 774 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1985) (although warrant
authorized seizure of evidence of tax fraud, required specificity was supplied by attached
affidavit which listed items to be seized with great detail), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847 (1986).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1093 (1 th Cir. 1986) (although wrong
street number and name were listed, executing police officer had visited premises previously
with informant); United States v. Turner, 770 F.2d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1985) (although wrong
street address was listed, there was no possibility of mistaken search since targeted premises
had been under surveillance for over one year), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1026 (1986); United
States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 372 (8th Cir.) (mistaken search was precluded since erroneous
address was nonexistent and targeted premises had been under surveillance), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 871 (1979); Anderson v. State, 249 Ga. 132, 287 S.E.2d 195 (1982) (executing officer had
previously investigated premises and talked to defendant).
75. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1023 nA. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Officers drawing a search
warrant for a unit of a multiple-occupancy building should be put to a more demanding
standard of reasonableness to justify any mistake than is required for those who rely on a
reasonable failure to recognize at all the multi-unit nature of a structure.").
76. Id. See also Hearing before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1978).
77. See generally Annotation, Search Warrant: Sufficiency of Description of Apartment or
Room to Be Searched in Multiple-Occupancy Structure, 11 A.L.R. 3rd 1330, 1333 (1967).
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police to the proper unit, and only the proper unit is searched. 78 The search
will also be upheld when the defendant is in control of the entire premises
or living with other persons in common.7 9 Searches will also be upheld in
cases where it appears that the entire structure is being used for illegal
activityY' Finally, the most significant exception is where the multi-unit
nature or character of the structure is not externally apparent and the police
officers did not know, or have reason to know, that more units were inside.8 '
This last exception was fully developed in United States v. Santore.82 The
building in this case appeared to be a single-family house, and no facts to
the contrary were available to the police. 3 In reality, the occupant had
subdivided the house in contravention of local ordinances. 8' The court
nonetheless upheld the warrant on the grounds that there was no possible
way for the police to know of the alteration since the occupant concealed
it. The court also noted that once the warrant was executed it would have
been too late to obtain another warrant based on the new information.8s
Thus, it appears that this exception is based on what is objectively available
in terms of information about the character of the building, and whether
the affiant's conclusion was reasonable. This exception was further qualified
in United States v. Davis, 6 where the court held that once the police discover
78. See generally United States v. Clement, 747 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1984). In Clement, the
warrant erroneously listed apartment number four, where respondent used to live, but police
arrived and searched only number three, the adjacent apartment respondent had actually moved
into. The court listed three factors which should be considered when the warrant is inaccurate:
1) whether the targeted premises are clearly described even if the address is incorrect; 2) whether
the intended premises are adjacent to those described and both are under the control of
respondent; 3) whether other correct parts of the warrant limit the search only to the targeted
apartment. Id. at 461. See also Annotation, supra note 77, at 1340.
In United States v. Strauss, 678 F.2d 886 (1 1th Cir. 1982), the court held that the warrant
must be precise enough to preclude a general search, and "the test is reasonableness of the
description." Id. at 892. In this case, the court found that such a standard was met. Id.
79. United States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1980). In Whitney, although the
premises were described as a single family dwelling, in actuality the house had been divided
into two premises. The court upheld the search since the police were unaware of any separation,
there was only one house number and one mailbox, and finally, respondent had control of the
whole premises. Id. at 908. See also United States v. Page, 580 F.2d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1978)
(warrant authorized the search of entire third floor, which contained two apartments, but the
target of warrant was in control of entire third floor). See generally Annotation, supra note
77, at 1341-43.
80. United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1301 (9th Cir. 1985) (although warrant
authorized search of an entire ranch, there was probable cause to search all buildings on ranch).
See generally Annotation, supra note 77, at 1343-44.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982) (Court listed four
recognized exceptions to the specificity requirement, found that all existed, and upheld search).
See generally Annotation, supra note 77, at 1344-45.
82. 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1960).
83. Id. at 67.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 557 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1977).
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their error, they may only search the premises of the intended target of the
warrant.87
The specificity requirement in the warrant process is the cornerstone of
the fourth amendment's protection against arbitrary searches of the home.8"
Indeed, this was the chief evil the Framers sought to avoid by including the
amendment in the Bill of Rights.8 9 Thus, it is a fair assumption that the
protection afforded the home is paramount in fourth amendment law.90
The remedy afforded victims of fourth amendment violations, that of
excluding the ill-gotten evidence at trial, has been severely limited. Since the
fourth amendment is curiously silent as to the procedures for its own
enforcement, the Court had to develop and apply its own remedy for dealing
with fourth amendment violations.9 The attacks on this remedy of exclusion,
and its subsequent restrictions, have led the Court to carve out exceptions
to the exclusionary rule in the absence of viable alternatives.9 These restric-
tions on the applicability of the exclusionary rule have resulted in a reshaping
of traditional constitutional principles. For example, Garrison seems to
indicate that the principle which holds all warrantless entries into a home,
absent exigent circumstances, as per se unreasonable, may no longer control. 9'
87. Id. at 1248 ("The only items seized during the search came from areas under Davis'
use and control.").
88. See supra note 68.
89. See supra note 21.
90. See generally United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) ("Searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.");
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that at least an arrest warrant is necessary
to effect arrest in suspect's home absent exigent circumstances, Court affirmed that home
deserves special protection); Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (absent exigent circumstances, it is
impermissible for police to enter a home to effect an arrest without a warrant).
91. The establishment of the exclusionary rule remedy for fourth amendment violations
came in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
92. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the Court introduced
the "Independent Source" doctrine, which allows the introduction of evidence obtained by
means other than the government's own constitutional violation. Id. at 392. In Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, held that
evidence obtained by tapping wires in violation of the Communications Act of 1934 was
inadmissible, but asserted that the link between the government's violation and subsequent
evidence produced may become "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. at 341.
The two latest exceptions to the exclusionary rule were adopted by the Court in 1984. In Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the Court announced its adoption of the "Inevitable
Discovery" doctrine which allows the introduction of evidence if the government can "establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have
been discovered by lawful means .... ." Id. at 444. Finally, the Court adopted the "good faith
exception" to the exclusionary rule in the companion cases of Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), which allow the introduction of evidence if obtained pursuant
to a facially sufficient warrant which is later held invalid due to lack of probable cause (Leon),
or a technical insufficiency (Sheppard).
93. See supra note 50.
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B. The Controversy Over The Exclusionary Rule
The Weeks doctrine, commonly known as the exclusionary rule, established
that illegally seized evidence could not be used against an accused.Y4 Other-
wise, the fourth amendment guarantees would have no meaning and "might
as well be stricken from the Constitution. " 95 However, the remedy of
exclusion was applied only where the federal government and its agencies
were involved in the seizure.9 The exclusionary rule became subject to
circumvention under the "Silver Platter Doctrine."' 97 This doctrine allowed
federal officials to enlist state law enforcement personnel, not yet subject to
the exclusionary rule, to gather evidence. This evidence was subsequently
used by the federal officials. Eventually, the "Silver Platter Doctrine" was
abolished in Elkins v. United States,98 thus extending the reach of the
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule was again extended in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States.99 There, the Court held that copying illegally
seized documents and using such as the basis for a subpoena was prohib-
ited.'0 Thus, Silverthorne was the basis for the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine. 01'
Because the fourth amendment was not yet applicable to the states, they
were left free to establish their own forms of enforcing the amendment. By
the time the Court held the fourth amendment applicable to the states in
Wolf v. Colorado, 02 only 16 states had adopted the exclusionary rule through
their own judicial decision or legislative action. 0 Although the Wolf Court
held that the fourth amendment was "implicit in the concept of ordered
94. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
95. Id. at 393. The defendant was arrested at his place of employment, and charged with
violation of section 213 of the Criminal Code for using the mails in furtherance of his lottery
activity. Id. at 386. A search producing evidence was conducted at defendant's home without
a warrant. Id.
96. Id. at 398.
97. The Silver Platter doctrine circumvented the exclusionary rule by allowing state officials,
not yet restrained by the rule, to turn over their illegally seized evidence to federal officials.
The Court first limited the application of this doctrine in the case of Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927), which prohibited the introduction of evidence seized by state officials with
the aid of federal officers. Later that same year the Court further limited the doctrine in the
case of Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), which prohibited the admission of
evidence seized by state officials for a federal purpose. The Silver Platter doctrine was eventually
abolished altogether in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
98. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
99. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
100. Id. at 392.
101. Although Silverthorne served as a basis for the doctrine, the actual phrase "fruit of the
poisonous tree" was coined in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). See also
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (stating that question is one of whether
evidence is obtained from exploitation of the illegality, or whether by means "sufficiently
distinguishable" to be purged of the taint from primary illegality).
102. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
103. Id. at 29.
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liberty" and thus applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment,' °4 the mode of enforcement chosen by the federal courts was held
inapplicable to the states. 05 The Court instead opted to let the states develop
their own remedial measures for dealing with fourth amendment violations
which would be best suited to the needs of the individual states.'06 One of
the most significant consequences of the Wolf case, however, is that it
planted the "seed" of the argument that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially
created remedy" and not "part and parcel" of the fourth amendment.'0
Wolf was subsequently overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio,1ee which
recognized that remedies other than the exclusionary rule which were designed
to provide redress to an individual for the violation of his fourth amendment
rights did not adequately do so.'°9 The Court pointed out that over half of
the states had adopted the Weeks doctrine in whole or in part,"0 and held
that the "rights and assurances" against unreasonable searches and seizures
would be "valueless" without the adoption of the exclusionary rule."' Mapp
seemed to put to rest the notion that the exclusionary rule was simply a
preferred method of enforcing the fourth amendment which could be replaced
by other adequate remedies."2 Since Mapp, the use of the exclusionary rule
to suppress illegally seized evidence both in federal and state criminal trials
has been a debated issue." 3 Generally, the arguments set forth by the critics
as well as the supporters of the rule center around the purpose of exclusion,"
104. Id. at 27-28.
105. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, held that although the fourth amend-
ment was applicable to the states, the manner of its enforcement was a different issue altogether,
subject to different remedial measures. Id. at 28.
106. Id. at 31.
107. Id. at 28. See also Leon, 468 U.S. at 931 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The germ of [the]
idea" that exclusionary rule is merely a "judicially created remedy" as held in Calandra,
originated in Wof).
108. 367 U.S. 652, 653 (1961).
109. Id. at 652. Dollree Mapp had been convicted of possessing certain obscene books,
pictures and photos in violation of section 2905.34 of the Ohio Code. Police broke into her
home without a warrant, pursuant to a tip about an unrelated bombing incident, and conducted
an extensive search which produced the obscene materials. Id. at 643-44.
110. Id. at 651.
111. Id. at 655.
112. Leon, 468 U.S. at 940 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that the concept
of the exclusionary rule as simply a "judicially created remedy" had "been forever put to rest"
with the Mapp decision. Id. See also Wilson, The Origin and Development of the Federal Rule
of Exclusion, 18 WAKE FOEST L. Rnv. 1073, 1104 (1982) ("The Mapp Court reaffirmed the
constitutional, as opposed to the discretionary, origin of the exclusionary rule, establishing the
right to the exclusion as [an essential part of the fourth amendment's protection].").
113. See supra note 17.
114. See generally Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREiGSHroN L. Rav. 565 (1983) (defends
existence of rule by judicial implication as opposed to remedy based on empirical evidence);
Stewart, supra note 14, at 1372 ("[N]o decision by the Court has ever fully explored the possible
alternative doctrinal bases for the rule, and the justifications for the rule seem to have changed
subtly over time-usually without any explicit recognition by the Justices involved.").
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and the use of a cost/benefit balancing test." 5 Indeed, an examination of
both of these concepts is necessary to understand the approach the Court
has recently adopted to limit the rule and create its exceptions. 6 Thus, this
Casenote will turn to a brief analysis of the purposes and criticisms of the
rule.
1. The purposes of exclusion
The major purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the police from
effecting unreasonable searches and seizures.' 7 Proponents of the rule reason
that if the evidence produced by the unconstitutional behavior is suppressed
at trial, the government will be more careful to comply with fourth amend-
ment mandates in the future."' Although recent Supreme Court cases suggest
that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is "specific deterrence," '" 9 the
supporters of the rule maintain that the proper focus should be on "systemic
deterrence."1 0
A second purpose of the rule is "to preserve judicial integrity" since to
sanction violations of the fourth amendment would be to "affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the Constitution."' 2'
115. Note, Constitutional Criminal Procedure-The Good Faith Exception in Action-Mas-
sachusetts v. Sheppard, 59 TuL. L. REv. 1100, 1103 (1985) (since Calandra, exclusionary rule
has been redefined and has become a "prophylactic device rather than a right, a mere deterrent
of police misconduct, not a means of rectifying the errors of judges and magistrates and of
preserving the judiciary from participation in constitutional infractions" whose application
depends on results of a cost/benefit balancing test).
116. See supra note 92.
117. Accord I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984) ("ITIhe 'prime purpose'
of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, is to deter future unlawful police misconduct."
(quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) and United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347 (1974))); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that state prisoner who
has fully litigated a fourth amendment claim in a fair trial may not obtain federal habeas relief
on ground that unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at trial, Court stressed that
primary purpose of exclusionary rule is deterrence); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
347-48 (1974) (holding that exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy," and its prime
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct).
118. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 221-22 (1960).
119. Specific deterrence can be defined as that which focuses on the misconduct of individual
police officers. Justice White's argument in Leon, that the exclusionary rule cannot "cure" the
invasion which has already taken place, suggests that the current Court focuses on this type of
deterrence. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
120. Systemic deterrence is defined as that which focuses on the entire system of law
enforcement. Retired Justice Stewart argues that although there is generally little evidence of
specific deterrence, there is a marked increase in the number of warrants issued after Mapp,
and there is a sharp increase in training of police officers on the fourth amendment. Stewart,
supra note 14.
121. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394; See also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(one of purposes of exclusionary rule is to prevent judiciary from becoming partners with police
in "official lawlessness"). For an interesting pre-Mapp analysis supporting the exclusionary
rule, see Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct By The Police, 52 J. Caum. L.,
CgRIEmoooY & POL. Sci. 255 (1961).
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The "imperative of judicial integrity" argument has recently fallen out of
favor with the majority of the Court.'2 However, if the purpose of the
exclusionary rule was broadly defined as deterring official government mis-
conduct as a whole, the "imperative of judicial integrity" would remain an
important factor in defining the scope of the rule.12D
A third purpose of the exclusionary rule focuses primarily on the public.
The rule minimizes the risk of undermining popular trust in the government
by assuring the public that the government will not profit from its lawless
behavior.' 4 One commentator has posited a fourth purpose of the rule,
namely to restore victims of illegal searches and seizures to the position that
they would have been in had the illegality not occurred.21 This purpose is
based on the theory that the fourth amendment guarantees citizens a personal
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.'12 What is important
to recognize at this point is that the Court's perception of these purposes
has defined the scope of the exclusionary rule, and may well determine its
fate. 127
122. Justice White rejected the argument of "judicial integrity" as a secondary consideration
which does not come into play absent "unusual circumstances." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.22.
See generally United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1975) ("Mhe 'imperative of
judicial integrity' is ... not offended if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good
faith that their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent" have held
that conduct to be unconstitutional); Sunderland, supra note 17, at 343 (arguing that "the
concept of judicial integrity has lost its independent potency"); Stewart, supra note 14, at 1382,
1383 & 1400 ("Describing the judiciary as a party to the constitutional violation begs the
question: what provision of the Constitution forbids the judiciary to admit illegally obtained
evidence"?).
123. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Brennan argues that "the objective of deterring improper police conduct is only part of the
larger objective of safeguarding the integrity of our adversary system ... it is monstrous that
courts should aid or abet the law-breaking police officer"); Henderson, Justice in the Eighties:
The Exclusionary Rule and the Principle of Judicial Integrity, 65 JUDicATURE 354, 355 (1982)
("In reducing the rule to pragmatic dimensions, critics ignore the original basis for the rule:
the principle of judicial integrity which demands that the courts be isolated from contagious
contact with unconstitutional activity.").
124. See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (one of the purposes of
exclusionary rule is to assure people-"all potential victims" of police misconduct-"that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior"). See generally Canon, Ideology and
Reality in the Debate Over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative Argument for its Retention,
23 S. Tax. L.J. 559, 580 (1982) (exclusionary rule should be kept even if its value as a deterrent
is minimal because it serves as "symbolic reassurance" that courts will not condone lawless
behavior of police); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRne.
L., CRUENOLOO Y & POL. Sci. 255 (1961) (unremedied fourth amendment violations tend to
breed contempt for law).
125. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
as a Compensatory Devise, 51 GEo. W. L. Rsv. 633, 636 (1983).
126. Id. at 636-37.
127. See, e.g., Note, United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard: Good Faith,
The Fourth Amendment, and the Exclusionary Rule, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 227, 242 ("The
Court's decision to adopt the government's proposed good faith exception was premised on
three considerations regarding the exclusionary rule: its origins, its purposes, and the effects of
its application."). See supra note 113.
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2. Criticism of the exclusionary rule
"We do not release a criminal from jail because we like to do so, or
because we think it is wise to do so, but only because the government has
offended constitutional principle in the conduct of his case." 2h Justice Harlan
attempted to justify the most obvious, immediate, and detrimental result of
the exclusionary rule's application.'" The application of the rule results in
suppression of evidence, which may lead to the freeing of persons clearly
guilty of criminal behavior." 0 Given the lack of empirical evidence on the
exclusionary rule's deterrent effect, critics argue that losing criminal convic-
tions is a particularly high price to pay to maintain a rule of questionable
effectiveness."' Another major criticism of the rule is that the remedy is
often disproportionate to the violation which actually took place." 2 Critics
also argue that exclusion was not historically required,' and that other
criminal procedure systems function well without adopting a remedy such
as the exclusionary rule."14 Finally, critics point to the lack of support for
exclusion in the text of the fourth amendment itself. 35
As retired Justice Stewart argues, however, the criticism of the exclusionary
rule is misdirected and should be focused on the fourth amendment itself. 36
Although the rule disallows the evidence in court, its critics fail to acknowl-
edge that the illegally seized evidence would not have been obtained in the
first place had the police complied with the fourth amendment.,"
While it is true that the deterrent effect of the rule is very difficult to
measure due to the absence of empirical data, one of the leading scholars
128. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. See McGarr, supra note 17, at 266; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-91 (1976).
131. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (exclusionary rule "has been unaided,
unhappily, by any empirical evidence on the effects of the rule"). For one of the most
comprehensive studies on the effects of the exclusionary rule, see Oaks, Studying the Exclu-
sionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970). But see Kamisar, A Defense
of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 CRw. L. Bu.L. 5, 35 (1979) (recent studies "have cast grave doubt
on [Oaks'l conclusions and inferences about the rule's inefficacy in affecting police behavior.").
132. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (Burger, J., dissenting).
"Although unfortunately ineffective, the exclusionary rule has increasingly been characterized
by a single, monolithic, and drastic judicial response to all official violations of legal norms."
Id.
133. But see Teague, Applications of the Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. Tax. L.J. 633, 635-38
(1982) (tracing history of exclusion prior to Mapp).
134. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29 (most countries protecting a similar right do not use rule of
exclusion). Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J.
*Cam. L., CRuhuoj.oGY & POL. Sc. 246, 251 (1961).
135. See Stewart, supra note 14, at 1381. Wilkey, Constitutional Alternatives to the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 23 S. Tax. L.J. 530, 542-43 (1982).
136. See Stewart, supra note 14, at 1392.
137. Kamisar, supra note 130, at 14. "If the government could not have gained a conviction
had it obeyed the Constitution, why should it be permitted to prevail because it has violated
the Constitution"?
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on criminal procedure has noted that there is good indication that the
exclusionary rule has had a positive effect on the criminal justice system. 13s
There is an increase in the use of search warrants, and while there had
previously been little or no training of proper police procedure as to the
dictates of the fourth amendment, most municipalities now give their police
force extensive training. 139 Also, relationships between prosecutors and police
have been created and developed to ensure that evidence is obtained by
legitimate methods.140 Finally, the claim by police officers that they are
"handcuffed" in their efforts to catch criminals is strong indication that the
exclusionary rule has had an impact on law enforcement officials and
procedures.
When critics focus on the "high cost" of exclusion, not only do they
overlook strong evidence that such costs are over-stated, 14' but their focus
is also misdirected. The purpose of the rule is not to compensate the victim,4 2
but rather to give effect to the guarantees of the fourth amendment."3
Although there is no textual support for the exclusion remedy in the amend-
ment itself, most of the provisions in the Constitution have been subject to
interpretation and remedies for these constitutional violations have been
traditionally supplied by the Court.'4
C. The Court Chooses Sides
In United States v. Calandra, 15 the Court defined the purpose of the
exclusionary rule solely in terms of the deterrence of police misconduct.'
The Court stressed that the rule is not a personal right, but rather, a
"judicially created remedy" which protects fourth amendment rights by
deterring police misconduct."47 Applying a test which balanced the costs of
extending the exclusionary rule to suppress illegally seized evidence in the
138. W.R LAPAvE, supra note 22, at 27.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Fyfe, The N.I.J. Study of the Exclusionary Rule, 19 CRim. L. BULL. 253 (1983).
According to this study, five percent of the felony cases going through the California state
system are rejected due to exclusionary rule considerations, and of those five percent, 70 percent
are drug-related cases. The study "suggests that the rule affects very few of the felony cases
that enter the California system, and that most of those it does effect involve drug offenses
rather than crimes against persons or property." Id. at 260. See also Canon, supra note 123,
at 560 ("A growing body of data, however, indicates that few persons arrested are able to use
the rule to escape conviction. Moreover, despite rhetoric to the contrary, only a relatively small
number of persons charged with violent crimes avoid conviction because of the rule.").
142. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (exclusionary rule safeguards fourth amendment rights
"generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved").
143. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
144. See Kamisar, supra note 130, at 16.
145. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
146. Id. at 347.
147. Id. at 348.
[Vol. 38:517
1989] MARYLAND v. GARRISON 535
context of a grand jury proceeding against the benefits of such an applica-
tion,'14 the Court concluded that because the grand jury is not ultimately
responsible for determining guilt, and because exclusion would impede the
fact-finding process of the grand jury,' 49 the "incremental deterrent effect"
could not outweigh the costs of exclusion. 50
This approach, which relies on a narrow definition of the exclusionary
rule's purpose and establishes a balancing test to determine the necessity of
exclusion, is the basis for further limitations of the rule since Calandra.
Thus, the Court has held that a defendant who has fully litigated a fourth
amendment claim at a fair trial may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that unlawfully seized evidence had been introduced at trial,"'
because the benefit of exclusion would be incremental at best.5 The Court
has also refused to extend the rule to encompass federal civil proceedings
which use evidence illegally seized by state officials,'53 or to civil deportation
proceedings. '14
At the same time the Court passed up opportunities to expand the reach
of the exclusionary rule, it also carved out numerous exceptions to the rule., 5
Just as the link between the initial violation and the evidence may become
"so attenuated as to dissipate the taint,"' 56 the Court reasoned that evidence
should not be suppressed if it was the product of an "independent source.' '1 7
148. Id. at 354.
149. Id.
150. Id. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 17.
151. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
152. Id. at 495. According to the Court, there is no reason to "assume that any specific
disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of evidence at trial or the reversal of
convictions on direct review would be enhanced" if the rule were extended to habeas corpus
proceedings. Id. at 493.
153. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976) (if exclusionary rule were applied to
IRS proceedings, benefits would be "minimal" and costs high: the enforcement of laws would
be hampered and relevant and reliable evidence would be excluded).
154. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046-50. The I.N.S. has its own "sensible and
reasonable" steps to ensure adherence of the fourth amendment, thus deterrence would be
minimal. However, the Court continued, the costs of applying the exclusionary rule to these
proceedings would hamper the system, and would require the courts to "close its eyes" to
continuing violations by illegal aliens. Id.
155. For a survey of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule that the Supreme Court has
developed since Weeks, see Bogdanos, Search and Seizure: A Reasoned Approach,.6 PACE L.
REv. 543 (1986). See also supra note 92.
156. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341. Accord Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963) ("On the evidence that Wong Sun had been released on his own recognizance
after a lawful arraignment, and had returned volutarily several days later to make the statement,
we hold that the connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint."' (quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341)).
157. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813 (1984) (information necessary to secure
warrant for search of petitioners' home was "possessed by the agents" before illegal entry; this
is an independent source since information gained after illegality was of no consequence to
obtaining warrant).
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The Court recognized the need to allow for reasonable mistakes of fact by
law enforcement personnel,' 58 and also adopted an Inevitable Discovery
doctrine in Nix v. Williams.'59 This doctrine allows for the use of illegally
seized evidence where the prosecution can establish that the evidence would
have inevitably been discovered by lawful means. The stage was set for the
Court to evaluate a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule."60
D. The "Good Faith" Exception
At first blush, the arguments for a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule suggest that such an exception is fair and reasonable."'6 Years before
the adoption of the "good faith" exception, the Court stated in dicta that
the deterrent argument for exclusion loses much of its effect when the
violation was made by a police officer, who, in good faith, believed he was
complying with the fourth amendment."2 In Illinois v. Gates,"'3 the Court
158. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971).
159. 467 U.S. 431 (1984). The Court held that "[ilf the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence
should be received." Id. at 444. See also Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the
Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 88, 100 (1974) (doctrine makes "prag-
matic sense" and should be applied unless it destroys value of exclusionary rule).
160. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
161. See Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRim. L. & CRUMn~oLoo'y 635 (1978) (good faith exception is in step
with trend of latest Supreme Court cases);. Harris, supra note 26, at 48 ("Today, with the
benefit of experience, the Supreme Court has begun to modify fourth amendment theory to
avoid unjust results ... and to accommodate the legitimate interest of society in protection
from crime."); Van De Kamp, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule-A Warning
Letter to Prosecutors, 26 S. Tsx. L.J. 167, 174 (applauds Leon decision, but warns prosecutors,
magistrates, and police to not abuse privilege so that the "door remains open" to allow for
further advances in relaxation of exclusionary rule).
Several states had adopted a good faith exception through judicial legislation: Asuz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (Supp. 1987), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-308 (1986); or through
judicial decision: United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). Also, the Attorney
General's Task Force on Violent Crime argued that "evidence should not be excluded from a
criminal proceeding if it has been obtained by an officer acting in the reasonable good faith
belief that it was in conformity to the Fourth Amendment." Attorney General's Task Force
On Violent Crime, Final Rep. 55 (1981).
162. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 254 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (provided compre-
hensive and forceful argument for adopting good faith exception); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 542 (1975) ("If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police
conduct then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that
the [police] had knowledge, or may be properly charged with knowledge, that the search was
unconstitutional ... ."). In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the police informed
respondent of his right to remain silent and of his right to counsel, but did not inform him of
the fact that if he was indigent, he was entitled to free counsel. Id. at 436. The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, held that the law does not require a perfect trial, only a fair
one. Thus, by analogy, police cannot realistically be required to be perfect. Id. at 446. See also
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (application of exclusionary rule should depend
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ordered re-argument on the issue of a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, despite the fact that the issue was not presented by either party in the
lower courts.2" Nonetheless, the Gates majority, over the criticism of Justice
White, 6 decided to leave the issue for another day, largely because such a
decision would have represented a departure from established procedure.'"
A year later, the Court officially adopted the good faith exception in the
companion cases of United States v. Leon' 6' and Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard.'"I In Leon, officers had obtained large quantities of drugs pursuant to
a search of two residences, executed under a facially valid warrant. 69 The
district court found that the search warrant lacked the requisite probable
cause since the informant's tip was "fatally stale."' 170 The court also held
that the warrant failed to satisfy the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test.' 7'
Although Justices Brennan 72 and Stevens' both urged the Court to reverse
and remand the case for a determination of probable cause based on its new
"totality of the circumstances" test, 74 the Court, in an opinion by Justice
White, chose instead to adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.'7 The Court began its analysis with the concept that the wrong con-
demned by the fourth amendment is "fully accomplished" by the unlawful
search and seizure, and cannot be "cured" by exclusion. 7 6 The Court then
proceeded to list all the costs of exclusion, 77 and described all the areas in
which exclusion had been limited and those in which it failed to apply. 78
on gravity of offense, as well as whether police action was reasonable and executed in good
faith).
163. 459 U.S. 1028 (1983).
164. Id.
165. 462 U.S. at 252 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
166. 459 U.S. 1028 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (since issue was not presented to the
lower courts, deciding good faith issue in this case would represent a "flagrant" departure
from established procedure).
167. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
168. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
169. 468 U.S. at 900-02.
170. Id. at 904.
171. Id. at 904-05.
172. 468 U.S. at 959 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[W]hen the Court goes beyond what is necessary
to decide the case before it, it can only encourage the perception that it is pursuing its own
notions of wise social policy, rather than adhering to its judicial role." Id. at 963.
174. See supra note 67.
175. "We have concluded that, in the Fourth Amendment context, the exclusionary rule can
be modified somewhat without jeopardizing its ability to perform its intended functions." 468
U.S. at 905.
176. Id. at 906 (citations omitted).
177. The "substantial societal costs" of exclusion include: impeding the fact-finding function
of the judge or jury by not allowing the introduction of reliable evidence; interfering with the
criminal justice system insofar as criminals go free or receive reduced sentences; and, generating
disrespect for the "administration of justice." Id. at 907-08 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 909-13. The Court relied on the following cases: United States v. Johnson, 457
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Following the balancing approach adopted in Calandra, the Court held that
evidence obtained by police pursuant to a facially valid warrant which is
later held to be invalid due to a lack of probable cause should not be
suppressed if the officer in good faith believed the warrant to be sufficient. 179
The standard applied is an objective one.8 0 In Sheppard the exception was
extended to include warrants determined to be invalid due to a technical
insufficiency.'"'
Justice White stressed that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule was
to deter police abuses.8 2 Anticipating the argument that magistrates might
purposely issue invalid warrants on the belief that the evidence will not be
suppressed due to the exception, he stressed that "there is no evidence
suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the
fourth amendment."' Holding that good faith is to be measured by an
objective standard,'" Justice White listed several examples which are not
covered by the good faith exception: when the supporting affidavit contains
false statements or misrepresentations;' when the warrant is so lacking in
indicia of probable cause or so facially deficient that an officer cannot
reasonably presume it to be valid;"8 6 or when the issuing magistrate has
abandoned his judicial role.'87
Justice Brennan wrote a scholarly and blistering dissent re-affirming his
conviction that the exclusionary rule is not merely a judicially created remedy,
but rather an essential part of the fourth and fourteenth amendments."8
U.S. 537 (1982) (no decisions marking "clear break with the past" will have retroactive
application); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (when arrest is made on good faith
reliance of statute that is subsequently held invalid); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)
(only victims of unconstitutional behavior have standing to challenge legality of a search); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus proceedings); Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)
(federal civil cases using state illegally seized evidence); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)
(when link between illegal behavior and evidence becomes too attenuated as to dissipate taint);
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury proceedings); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969) (conspiracy cases).
179. 468 U.S. at 913.
180. Id. at 919 n.20 ("We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an
objective one.").
181. 468 U.S. at 988. The police were unable to find the proper warrant form since the local
court was closed, and were forced to use a controlled substance warrant of another town. The
issuing magistrate had assured the police officer that the proper changes had been made. Id.
at 985-86.
182. Leon, 468 U.S. 916 (1984).
183. Since, as the Court asserts, judges have no stake in the outcome of a criminal case,
"Itihe threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them." Id. at 917.
184. Id. at 919 n.20.
185. Id. at 923. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
186. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
187. Id.
188. 468 U.S. at 930. ("A proper understanding of the broad purposes sought to be served
by the Fourth Amendment demonstrates that the principles embodied in the exclusionary rule
rest upon a far firmer constitutional foundation than the shifting sands of the Court's deterrence
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Justice Brennan presented an analysis of the development of the exclusionary
rule and rebutted all of the majority's criticisms. 18 9 He concluded by listing
three serious consequences of the Court's decision to adopt a good faith
exception. First, it announces to issuing magistrates that their decisions to
issue invalid warrants will be effectively "insulated" from review on appeal
and thus, less care will be devoted to the warrant process itself.19° Second,
the exception will not effectively deter police, since their conduct will be
upheld whenever objectively reasonable. 19' Finally, the standard will rarely
offer greater flexibility than Gates, and as the two concepts overlap, the
courts must "entertain the mind-boggling concept of an objectively reason-
able reliance upon an objectively reasonable warrant.' ' 92
The Leon decision has since been applauded by commentators' 93 and
adopted by federal courts. 94 Although some state courts have explicitly
refused to adopt a good faith exception, 19S its harshest attacks have come
mainly from scholars and commentators.'9 Critics fear that the probable
rationale."). See also Note, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Under the
Fourth Amendment: United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 19 SUF'oLK U.L.
REv. 977 at 998-99 (1985) ("The landmark Leon decision is the antithesis of the much stronger
view, expressed in the earlier cases, that the suppression doctrine is grounded in the [Consti-
tution].").
189. 468 U.S. at 932-43.
190. Id. at 956.
191. Id. at 957.
192. Id. at 958-59.
193. See supra note 161.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Spilatro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986) (court followed Leon,
but evidence was still suppressed since officers cannot reasonably rely on validity of warrant
authorizing search for evidence in violation of stated statutes); United States v. Washington,
782 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1986) (warrant held to be so facially deficient that any reliance on it
would be unreasonable, thus, evidence was suppressed despite the circuit's adherence to Leon
doctrine); United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (although warrant authorized
seizure of "all corporate records," thus subsequently being held invalid as a general warrant,
appellate court remanded case to district court for a finding on issue of whether good faith
reliance by executing officers was reasonable); United States v. Haley, 758 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.
1985) (part of warrant authorizing search of a residence was held invalid, but evidence was not
suppressed because court found officers' reliance reasonable).
195. See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 491 A.2d 37 (1985) (rejected Leon
doctrine for three main reasons: (1) it eliminates review of probable cause; (2) it "fosters a
careless attitude toward details by the police and issuing [magistrates]," and; (3) to preserve
judicial integrity). People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 422, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458 (1985) (refusing
to adopt Leon doctrine on state constitutional grounds, and asserting that exception completely
frustrates exclusionary rule's purpose since "a premium is placed on the illegal police action
and a positive incentive is provided to others to engage in similar lawless acts in the future").
196. See Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60
IND. L.J. 287 (1985); Hunter, Is the Exclusionary Rule a Relic of the Past? Leon, Sheppard
and "Beyond, " 12 Omo N.U.L. Rev. 165; Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause, " "Good Faith, "
and Beyond, 69 IowA L. REv. 551 (1984); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 17; Misner,
Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. Cuim. L.& C. 507 (1986).
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cause requirement will be diluted,'9 that fourth amendment law will stag-
nate, 98 and that the language in Leon will "sow the seeds for a rapid and
broad expansion" of the doctrine.'9
Indeed, these fears were well-founded, as demonstrated when the Court
further extended Leon in the 1987 case of Illinois v. Krull.mO In Krull, state
officials visited an auto wrecking yard pursuant to an Illinois statute requiring
auto and auto parts sellers to allow inspection of their records.2' Since the
yard did not have any records, the official conducted a warrantless search
of the yard, which produced four stolen cars.20 Although the statute was
declared unconstitutional, the evidence of the search was allowed. The Court
drew an analogy between Krull and Leon regarding the deterrent effect of
the application of the exclusionary rule. The Court held that suppressing
evidence seized pursuant to a facially valid statute has no deterrent effect
on the legislature.2 3 Thus, unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, the
good faith exception protects those police officers who comply with it.2
Since Calandra,205 the majority of the Court has demonstrated its hostility
to the exclusionary rule by defining its purpose in a narrow fashion and
using a cost-benefit test. This approach provided the justification for Leon,
and can easily be extended to warrantless searches and seizures.2 Such an
extension will further weaken the protections of the fourth amendment and
will make the exclusionary rule an ineffective and arbitrary remedy.2
197. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. at 238, 491 A.2d at 42 ("Noncompliance with the probable
cause requirement is not a mere sophisticated technicality which can be regarded as insubstantial.
* . . Probable cause is the single most important consideration when determining whether an
individual's privacy has been lawfully invaded.").
198. See Stewart, supra note 14, at 1400; Note, United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v.
Sheppard: Good Faith, the Fourth Amendment, and the Exclusionary Rule, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J.
227, 251 (1985).
199. See Bacigal, An Alternative Approach to the Good Faith Controversy, 37 MERcER L.
REv. 957 (1986).
200. 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987).
201. Id. at 1163-65.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1167. The majority, per Justice Blackmun, reasoned that any difference between
Leon and Krull would rest on whether or not there would be any deterrent effect on the
legislative branch by the use of the exclusionary rule. Blackmun concluded that like the judiciary,
the legislative branch is not the focus of the rule, and thus it would not be deterred by
suppression. Id. at 1167-68.
204. Id. at 1167.
205. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
206. Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 944-46 (1986). After warning that good
faith may easily be extended to warrantless search[es], Professor Dripps argues that there are
"sound analytical and catagorical objections" to such an extension. First, the "dilution" of
"existing standards" would lead to "speculative searches," second, the warrant process itself
would become less attractive, and finally, judicial review would be sacrificed in this area since
the exception would "withdraw judicial scrutiny from a class of executive actions that are
concededly illegal." Id. at 945-47.
207. Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1423 (1986).
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III. THE GARRISON CASE
A. Facts Of Garrison
The Baltimore police obtained a warrant to search the person and apart-
ment of Lawrence McWebb, after having received a tip from a reliable
informant2°8 that McWebb was a drug dealer known as "Red Cross." 2°9 The
affiant, Detective Marcus, corroborated the information by visiting the
suspect's premises and making an external inspection.210He called the Balti-
more Gas & Electric Company, which verified that the third floor premises,
located at 2036 Park Avenue, was occupied by McWebb.211 The detective
also checked with the Baltimore Police Department, which verified the
address, and discovered then that McWebb had a previous criminal record.
212
Although Marcus was aware of the multi-unit character of the building,
213
the trial court found that he reasonably believed the entire third floor was
occupied by McWebb alone. 2 4 Upon executing the warrant, however, the
warrant was found to be overbroad insofar as it authorized the search of
the entire third floor .21 Detective Marcus and five other officers split into
two groups upon arriving at the third floor landing216 and, although both
McWebb and Garrison were present,217 searched both apartments. 2I Upon
"Unless the Court can be persuaded that Calandra's incremental-deterrence-has-no-
value approach is wrong, its continued application will ultimately produce the
conclusion the Court began to construct in Calandra: There is so little left of the
exclusionary rule, it makes no sense to retain it; its application is about as arbitrary
and unpredictable depending on your perspective, as being struck by lightning or
winning the lottery. Leon almost gets us there."
Id.
208. The informant had been instrumental in the successful prosecution of eight search and
seizure cases and had purchased marijuana from McWebb at this third floor apartment. 473
A.2d 514, 515 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
209. Id. The warrant stated:
Affidavit having been made before me by Detective Albert Marcus, Baltimore Police
Department, Narcotic Unit, that he has reason to believe that on the person of
Lawrence Meril McWebb ... [andl that on the premises known as 2036 Park
Avenue third floor apartment, described as a three-story brick dwelling with the
numerals 2-0-3-6 affixed to the front of same in the city of Baltimore....
App. 46 at 9.
210. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1015.
211. Garrison, 303 Md. 385, 494 A.2d 193 (Md. 1985).
212. Id. at 387, 484 A.2d at 193-94.
213. 107 S. Ct. at 1023 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. 58 Md. App. at 430, 473 A.2d at 518.
215. Id. at 515.
216. Police testified that upon entering the third floor foyer, Garrison was standing in a
body cast and pajamas and that the doors to the right and to the left were open. Id. at 516.
217. There was no necessity to break into the apartment, since McWebb arrived shortly
before the execution of the warrant. Id. at 515-16.
218. The dissent points to the fact of an initial security sweep as a factor which works
against judging the police officer's mistake as "reasonable." 107 S. Ct. at 1026.
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discovering that they were mistakenly searching an additional apartment not
intended by the warrant, the police stopped their search of Garrison's
apartment, but only after contraband was seized. The contraband formed
the basis for convicting Garrison of violating the Maryland Controlled
Substances Act.21
9
The trial court made 11 findings of fact.2 20 The Court held that the search
was valid under the exception for multi-units when the character of the
building is not known.Y The intermediate appellate court affirmed on the
same grounds, stressing that the crucial issue was whether the police made
a good faith effort to describe the premises.mn
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the warrant authorized the
search of only McWebb's apartment and reversed.m The court stressed that
under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,2 which is in pari
materia with the fourth amendment, 221 general warrants are illegal.M Since
the warrant only authorized the search of McWebb's apartment, and since
no exigent circumstances existed to justify the search of Garrison's apart-
ment, the entry and search of Garrison's apartment could not be sustained. 7
Addressing the exception relied on by the lower court to justify the police
error, the Court of Appeals held that the exception only applies when the
officers have no reason to know the character of the building,2U and only
when the right premises are searched. " 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
219. 107 S. Ct. at 1015.
220. 58 Md. App. at 422-24, 473 A.2d at 517-18. There was a great deal of contradictory
testimony presented to the court. For example, the police claimed that the apartments were not
marked, but a photograph was introduced into evidence showing "3F" and "3R" on the door
jambs. Id. at 516. Also, the police insist that neither McWebb nor Garrison attempted to warn
them of separate apartments, yet, McWebb claimed that he told detective Marcus that he lived
in the "third floor rear" apartment. Id. at 516-17.
221. Id. at 519.
222. The court stated that "[iln this case we are concerned with ... what the police knew
or should have known." Id.
223. "The warrant in the instant case precisely and unambiguously described the premises
to be searched: McWebb's apartment. The police then expanded the search to a second apartment
not described or mentioned in the warrant." 303 Md. at 395, 494 A.2d at 198.
224. Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 26 states:
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to
seize any person or property, are [grievous] and oppressive; and all general warrants
to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or
describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be
granted.
MD. CoNsT. art. 26.
225. 303 Md. at 391, 494 A.2d at 196.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 394, 494 A.2d at 197.
228. Id.
229. Id. Accord United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1987) ("In the final
analysis, the agents followed exactly the authority of the warrant in that they searched only
the two safes [in the targeted premises]" even though such premises were not clearly defined
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since the decision was based on an interpretation of fourth amendment law.
B. The Majority's Analysis
The Supreme Court framed its inquiry in the form of two issues: 1) the
validity of the warrant vis-a-vis the specificity requirement, 23° and 2) whether
the officer's good faith mistake in the execution of the warrant violated
Garrison's constitutional rights.uI In judging the validity of the warrant, the
Court conceded that the warrant was ambiguous in scope, but that it must
be considered in light of the facts that Marcus disclosed, or that Marcus
had a duty to discover and disclose to the issuing magistrate. 232 The Court
held that a valid warrant could not be invalidated by information discovered
after the warrant was issued.23 Therefore, the resolution of the issue focused
on the information that was available to the affiant of the warrant at the
time the warrant was requested. 2 4 The Court agreed with all three Maryland
courts that, based on objective facts, the officer reasonably believed McWebb
occupied the entire third floor,2" and concluded that the warrant was valid.2"
As to the execution of the warrant, the Court relied on Hill v. California,27
and held that an officer's reasonable failure to appreciate that a valid warrant
describes the premises to be searched too broadly is allowable under Hill. 2 8
The Court recognized the need to allow for good faith mistakes made by
police in the performance of their duties.2 9 Since the objective facts available
to the police suggested no distinction between McWebb's apartment and the
entire third floor premises, the officers' execution was reasonable under
either interpretation of the warrant.2
in search warrant); United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1987) (determining
sufficiency of description of warrant by analyzing whether there are sufficient facts to establish
that evidence will be at the place to be searched, and extent to which warrant is able to guide
executing officer in distinguishing targeted items from other items); United States v. Heldt, 668
F.2d 1238, 1265.66 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (although office not listed in warrant was searched, no
evidence from that seizure was used against any party, even though court held search was
reasoniable and in good faith).
230. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1017.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1018.
233. Id. "Just as the discovery of contraband cannot validate a warrant invalid when issued,
so it is equally clear that the discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was
unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant." Id.
234. The Court acknowledged that arguments could be made regarding whether Marcus
should have taken further steps to ascertain the character of the third floor. Id. at n.10.
235. rd.
236. Id. at 1018.
237. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
238. 107 S. Ct. at 1019. "While Hill involved an arrest without a warrant, its underlying
rationale that an officer's reasonable misidentification of a person does not invalidate a valid
arrest is equally applicable to an officer's reasonable failure to appreciate that a valid warrant
describes too broadly the premises to be searched." Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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C. The Dissent
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented and
stressed that the warrant limited the search to only McWebb's apartment,2"
and that the search was expanded to Garrison's apartment absent exigent
circumstances or a warrant. 4 2 First, the dissent argued that the home has
always received special protection under the fourth amendment and that
absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry into a home is per se
unreasonable.243 Justice Blackmun stressed that the specificity requirement is
mandated by the fourth amendment in order to limit the scope of the search;
warrants deficient in this requirement are held to be invalid.2
The dissent next turned to the majority's justification of the warrant and
the Garrison search in terms of good faith mistake.14S The precedential value
of Hill was questioned, because the evidence the police obtained in that case
under an "honest mistake of fact" was used against the intended target of
the arrest.2 6 The dissent also discredited the trial court's use of the "character
unknown" exception to the particularity-of-description requirement of multi-
units. 247 Since the officers were aware that the structure under suspicion was
a multi-unit building, the dissent argued, they therefore did have notice of
the potential for more than one unit per floor.248 Even if such a reasonable
mistake was allowed as an exception to the warrant requirement, it is doubtful
that either the investigation prior to obtaining the warrant, 49 or the search 2
was reasonable in light of the facts.2-'
241. Id. at 1020 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenters did not find the warrant ambig-
uous. "The words of the warrant were plain and distinctive: the warrant directed the officers
to seize marijuana and drug paraphernalia on the person of McWebb and in Mc Webb's
apartment.. . ." Id. at 1021 (emphasis included).
242. 107 S. Ct. at 1020.
243. Id. at 1020-21.
244. Id. at 1021.
245. Id. at 1022. "Because the Court cannot justify the officers' search under the 'exceptional
circumstances' rubric, it analyzes the police conduct here in terms of 'mistake."' Id.
246. Id. at 1022-23. "It may make some sense to excuse a reasonable mistake by police that
produces evidence against the intended target of an investigation or warrant if the officers had
probable cause for arresting that individual or searching his residence. Similar reasoning does
not apply with respect to one whom probable cause has not singled out and who is the victim
of the officer's error." Id. at 1023.
247. See 58 Md. App. at 432-33, 473 A.2d at 520-21.
248. 107 S. Ct. at 1023 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
249. Although Marcus knew that the building in question was a multi-unit structure, he did
not go inside to check the mailboxes, or ask the informant if more than one apartment was
located on the third floor. Id. at 1024. Also, the dissent argued that the officer could have
inquired with other utility companies, since given the nature of the structure, "the detective's
inquiry of the gas company should not have relieved him of the obligation to pursue other.
less burdensome steps .. ." Id. at 1024 n.6.
250. The dissent stresses that the officers should have become aware of the existence of two
separate apartments well before the evidence was found. Id. at 1025. Both McWebb and
Garrison were present, and none of the executing officers asked if there were more than one
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III. ANALYSIS
As Garrison indicates, the fear that the "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule would result in the stagnation of fourth amendment law 2
was not groundless. Although the Court did not allow the admission of the
evidence under the Leon doctrine, it analyzed both the validity of the warrant
and its execution in terms of objective reasonableness, rather than by ad-
dressing the underlying fourth amendment issues. In so doing, the Court
allowed a warrantless entry and search into a home, and diluted the specificity
requirement of the warrant process. Yet, after Leon, the Court could have
admitted the evidence based on the officers' "good faith" reliance on a
facially valid warrant, and then proclaimed the warrant invalid. Thus, the
Court could have reached the same result while leaving the specificity re-
quirement intact, and adhered more closely to precedent.2 3
A. The Warrantless Entry Into Garrison's Apartment
As the dissent and the Maryland Court of Appeals pointed out, the
language "third floor apartment" in the context of a search warrant for
McWebb's premises in a multi-unit building clearly authorized the search of
only McWebb's apartment.23 4 Any intrusion to another unit must be justified
by a warrant, 2" consent,2 6 or exigent circumstances. 2 7
The Court could not justify the entry into Garrison's apartment under
any established exception to the warrant requirement, therefore, it chose to
apartment on the third floor. Id. at 1025-26. Also, the police conducted an initial security
sweep before the search, and the facts show that during this sweep their error could have been
discovered. Id. at 1026.
251. Id. at 1026. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The test of reasonableness is not
easily defined. The Bell Court stated:
[iun each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against
the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the
scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justifi-
cation for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Id. at 559.
See also United States v. Votteler, 544 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (6th Cir. 1976). When a search is
directed at a multi-unit structure, police must consider "external indicia" such as door bells,
mailboxes and utility meters, and make a reasonable effort to ascertain the correct premise or
else they cannot claim "honest mistake." Id.
252. See supra note 195.
253. See supra note 196.
254. 107 S. Ct. at 1021 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
255. See supra note 49.
256. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
257. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-15 ("Searches and seizures inside a home without
a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances."). According to the
facts in the Garrison case, the officers saw marijuana atop Garrison's dresser during the initial
security sweep. The dissent suggests that after seeing such, they could have secured the apartment
and sought a search warrant for Garrison's apartment as well. 107 S. Ct. at 1026 n.l I (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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rely on Hi05 1 to support its view that the police must be afforded some
"latitude" for good faith mistakesY2 In Hill, the police had probable cause
to arrest Hill, obtained an arrest warrant and went to Hill's apartment to
execute the warrant. Hill was not present, but his friend, Miller, who matched
Hill's description was present. The police, believing Miller to be Hill, arrested
Miller and conducted a search pursuant to that arrest.? Upon learning of
their mistake, Miller was released, but Hill was prosecuted with the evidence
obtained from the search.26' The Court held that "sufficient probability, not
certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment";
because the police officer's mistake was reasonable, the arrest was valid,
and thus the evidence found incident to that arrest was not suppressed.2
Other courts have also used the Bill analysis to admit evidence seized as
a result of an objectively reasonable mistake by police.26 Yet, this reasoning
has not been applied to justify a warrantless entry and search of a home
against an unintended target of the search.2" After Garrison, "reasonable
mistake of fact" can be added to the list of exceptions in warrantless searches
and seizures in a home.
B. The Validity Of The Warrant
As described earlier in the Casenote, the particularity-of-description re-
quirement necessarily limits the scope of a search, since law enforcement
officials must have probable cause to believe evidence is at the place to be
searched before the warrant is issued. 26 When such warrants authorize the
search of a multi-unit structure, the general rule is that the warrant must be
sufficiently particular in order to preclude the search of other units.26 Unless
258. 401 U.S. 797.
259. 107 S. Ct. at 1018-19.
260. 401 U.S. at 799.800. Hill was a pre-Chimel incident, thus, the police, having probable
cause to arrest Hill for an armed robbery, went to his residence and found Miller. Miller fit
the description of Hill so the police put him under arrest, despite his protests to the contrary,
and conducted an extensive search incident of that arrest. rd.
261. Id. at 801.
262. Id. at 804.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Glover, 725 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905
(1984). In Glover, defendant was arrested by the F.B.I. because he was mistaken for one
Mathis, and the subsequent frisk produced a gun. Id. at 122. The court held that the arrest
was valid under Hill, since the police had probable cause to arrest Mathis, and they reasonably
believed Glover to be Mathis. Id. at 122-23. See also United States v. Allen, 629 F.2d 51 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). In Allen, the defendant was arrested for drinking in a public place, and the
subsequent search produced heroin. Id. at 53. The defendant challenged the initial arrest on
the grounds that he was standing in an area encompassed by a nearby catering service's liquor
license. Id. The court held that the officer's mistake was reasonable, and he was acting under
the basis of observable facts, not mere suspicion. Id. at 55-56.
264. Garrison, 107 S, Ct. at 1023 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265. See supra note 68.
266. Annotation, supra note 77.
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one of the well-defined exceptions apply, 267 the warrant, as well as the
subsequent search, is held to be invalid.
The facts indicate that the Court could possibly have used the "common
use" exception to the particularity-of-description requirement, because it
appears that McWebb and Garrison had equal access to each other's apart-
ments.2'6 Or the Court could have adopted the trial court's analysis of the
Santore exception, 269 and,held that even though the character of the building
was known, the exception would apply since the character of the third floor
was not known. However, this analysis does have its problems, since the
Santore exception has only been held to apply when the proper unit is
searched. 20 Following this approach would have represented a large expan-
sion of this exception.
Instead of using one of the above exceptions, the Court relaxed the
specificity of description requirement of a search warrant. The Court con-
ceded that the warrant was subject to two different interpretations and
therefore was ambiguous in scope.27' While an ambiguous warrant is invalid,
the Court nonetheless found the ambiguous warrant in the Garrison case
valid. Such a departure from the general rule necessarily relaxes the standard
for the specificity requirement, which is arguably the cornerstone of the
warrant process and an instrument for protection against fourth amendment
violations .27
C. "Good Faith" As An Alternative Analysis
The best approach for the Court to have taken in the Garrison case to
uphold Garrison's conviction and abide by settled precedent, would have
been to follow the recent precedent of Leon.271 As Professor LaFave argues,
"whether the description in the warrant in fact was constitutionally adequate
is no longer determinative on the suppression issue. 274 Unless the warrant
is so facially deficient that an officer could not reasonably rely on its validity,
the search would be upheld due to the officer's good faith reliance on its
validity.
267. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
268. The Court of Special Appeals seems to have preferred this argument: "The court in
the present case, we decide, could reasonably conclude that both persons seemed to be making
themselves at home throughout the third floor." 473 A.2d at 522. Also, while the officers were
in Garrison's apartment, the phone rang, and the caller asked for "Red Cross," McWebb's
alias. Id. at 518.
269. "It appears that, when ruling upon the propriety of the search, the trial judge in this
case had such an exception in mind." Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1023, n.4 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
270. See Santore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1960).
271. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1018.
272. See supra note 68.
273. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
274. 2 W.R. LAFAVE, SERCH AND SEtZURE: A TREAliSE ON THE FouxRTH AMENDMENT 207
(2d ed. 1987).
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If the belief that McWebb occupied the entire third floor was reasonable,
as the majority so adamantly argues, the "good faith" reliance on the
warrant itself could be adjudged reasonable. The subsequent invalidation of
the warrant due to a deficiency in the description of the place to be searched
would therefore not require the suppression of the seized evidence. Such an
approach is possible under the "good faith" exception, and the sufficiency-
of-description requirement would have been left intact.
IV. IMPACT
After Garrison, it is questionable whether the home still holds the "special
protection" 275 under the fourth amendment that it has long enjoyed. If
Garrison is an indication of the Court's current position, the answer to this
question would appear to be negative, since the Court has easily given a
post hoc justification for the entry and search of a residence for which no
probable cause to search existed. 276 As one commentator has noted, the
Court maintains that searches pursuant to defective warrants violate the
fourth amendment, yet the Court is unwilling to supply a remedy. 277
The Court's decision in Garrison undoubtedly expands the good faith
exception to the warrant requirement by its use of good faith mistake to
justify the warrantless entry and search of Garrison's apartment. One of the
major fears held by opponents of the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule is that courts will look at the reasonableness of a police officer's behavior
rather than at the underlying fourth amendment issues. 27 1 Indeed, the ma-
jority in Leon held that courts should turn immediately to a consideration
of the officer's good faith unless the case presents an "important" fourth
amendment question. 2
79
275. See supra note 50.
276. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 739 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir. 1984) (executing officers
needed to establish probable cause, which they did not have according to court, before entering
home; this illegality cannot be cured by information later procured after entry and search),
rev'd on other grounds, 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985).
277. Dripps, supra note 205, at 934. "For all practical purposes, a search unsupported by
probable cause but pursuant to a facially valid warrant is now legal." Id.
278. See generally LaFave, The Seductive Call of Expediency, 1984 U. ILL. L. Ray. 895
(Court has justified following course of expediency by using over-stated costs, understated
benefits, and ignoring imperative of judicial integrity); Duke, supra note 206, at 1422 ("[Leon]
was merely a mild progression in the process of gutting the Fourth Amendment.").
The issue should not be how warrants are viewed in hindsight, but how they were viewed by
those executing them. Justice Brennan argued that "[t]he Court's attempt to cure this defect
by post hoc judicial construction evades principles settled in this Court's Fourth Amendment
decisions." Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 493 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
279. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925 (1984). The lower courts have been left the
option of resolving the underlying fourth amendment issue or turning directly to a good faith
analysis. However, the Court stated "[wle have no reason to believe that our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence would suffer by allowing reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in
making this choice." Id.
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However, the question remains: what exactly is an "important" fourth
amendment question? In Leon, Justice White listed several examples of cases
in which "important" fourth amendment questions are presented: 1) if the
"resolution" of a fourth amendment question is "necessary to guide future
action by law enforcement officers and magistrates"; 2) if good faith is
difficult to determine without first turning to the fourth amendment question;
and 3) when magistrates need to be "informed of their errors" by the
resolution of a fourth amendment question.20 These situations listed by
Justice White are vague, subject to interpretation, and set no clear standards
to guide the lower courts in resolution of fourth amendment claims.
The Garrison case is a good example of an "important" fourth amendment
question under all three of the situations listed above. Although not decided
under Leon, the majority's analysis was one of reasonableness and good
faith mistake. The underlying fourth amendment issues such as the validity
of the warrant and the warrantless entry into Garrison's apartment were not
addressed under traditional fourth amendment analysis. Yet the resolution
of these issues would surely provide necessary guidance to police officers in
obtaining information of the intended premises, especially when a multi-unit
building is involved. Also, as the dissent points out, it is questionable whether
the police acted in good faith.28 A resolution of the fourth amendment
issues would assist in this determination. Finally, the Court's focus on
reasonableness gives absolutely no guidance to magistrates in evaluating the
particularity-of-description requirement. An ambiguous warrant was found
to be specific, thus relaxing the requirement, yet new guidelines have not
been provided by the Court.
If a case does not present an "important" fourth amendment question,
the court will have to look at the actions of the police and consider all
relevant facts to determine whether or not the search and seizure was
objectively reasonable. Yet, questions remain as to what standard of objec-
tivity should be used, and how much investigation is "reasonable" thus,
bringing the warrant within the good faith mistake exception. 28 The Court
has given no indication of whether the standard should be that of a "rea-
sonable man" as in tort law, or that of a reasonable police officer, with or
without fourth amendment law training, or whether the standard should be
higher. The lack of an answer to this question poses the problem of whether
a uniform national standard will be preferred over local standards, which
differ according to available training and practices. It seems that only the
most blatant of violations will be unprotected by good faith.211
280. Id.
281. See supra notes 248 & 250.
282. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 93. "What is happening, you see, is that the constabulary
across the nation is increasingly broadening the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement.
The issue, of course, is whose good faith is the standard. It seems to me we are accepting the
lowest common denominator among the police as the group setting the standard. Instead of
raising our sights, we are lowering them." (emphasis in original).
283. In United States v. Palacios, 666 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D. Tex. 1987), the court interpreted
1989]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
The line between evidence which is excludable and evidence which is not
was appropriately drawn by Weeks and Mapp. Those cases defined the line
of demarcation by differentiating between behavior that is constitutional and
that which is unconstitutional. The "mildness," "honesty" or "inadver-
tentance" with which the acts are carried out should be irrelevent to fourth
amendment inquiry because differentiating between degrees of seriousness
will present unmanageable standards. 294 The Garrison case will no doubt
have an effect on the standard for the investigation and preparation of a
search warrant directed against an apartment in a multi-unit budding. Tra-
ditionally, this standard has required a strict adherence to a clear description
of the targeted unit in order to preclude the search of another residence.2"
As the case suggests, this standard has been relaxed.
Perhaps the most important question raised by Garrison is, to what extent
may "good faith mistake" be used to circumvent the warrant requirement?
If a warrant is obtained, its adequacy should not be judged apart from the
underlying principles of the warrant requirement, which is the protection
against arbitrary searches and seizures. 286 The warrant requirement places
the judgment of the magistrate between the police and the public.2 87 The
latest decisions seem to indicate that the Court is moving away from the
warrant approach of the fourth amendment and toward a reasonableness
approach. 28' Rather than using the traditional analysis centered around the
warrant requirement, the Court now evaluates a fourth amendment violation
in terms of objective reasonableness.Y9
VI. CONCLUSION
Weeks290 was the first and last unanimous decision by the Court with
respect to the exclusionary rule. Since that time, the rule has undergone
Garrison in order to determine whether the mistake of fact by the police was "objectively
reasonable." The police arrested the defendant, Juan Palacios, Sr., and conducted a search of
his home incident to that arrest. Id. at 114. The warrant authorizing the arrest, however, was
for Juan Palacios, Jr., the son of the defendent. Id. The search produced a .38 caliber revolver
which the defendent, a convicted felon, possessed unlawfully. Id. The court stated that the
"ultimate issue in this case ... is whether the mistake was a reasonable one." Id. at 115. Since
the police had a picture of the defendent's son (who was in his early twenties) and the defendant
was clearly in his forties, the court held that the mistake was not reasonable. Id.
284. Kamisar, supra note 17, at 83. "A court which admits the evidence in a case involving
a 'run of the mill' Fourth Amendment violation demonstrates an insufficient commitment to
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 83-84.
285. See supra note 71.
286. See supra note 68.
287. The Court has recognized the requirement as a necessary protection. See McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)("[H]istory shows that the police acting on their own
cannot be trusted.").
288. See Bloom, supra note 21, at 692-93.
289. Mertens & Wassertrom, supra note 17, at 372. "A distressingly broad range of miscon-
duct will be excused under the good faith exception, for use of the exception will almost surely
change the fourth amendment standard for searches and seizures from probable cause to general
reasonableness." Id.
290. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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drastic transformations, as the underlying asserted purpose is redefined. As
commentators have correctly noted, the concept of judicial integrity no longer
plays a role in the decision of whether or not evidence procured by an
illegality should be suppressed.2 9' This result is unfortunate, because the
limited definition of the rule as a police deterrent has greatly narrowed the
applicability of the exclusionary rule.
The Garrison decision is another step forward in disarming the remedial
potency of the exclusionary rule. Although the search could have been upheld
under the good faith exception, and the warrant declared invalid, the majority
instead, in one stroke, upheld the validity of the warrant despite the defi-
ciency in the description and the fact that the police entered Garrison's
apartment without either consent or exigent circumstances.
One commentator recently noted that the government's war on drugs has
resulted in an attack on "traditional protections afforded to criminal defen-
dants under the Bill of Rights .... The United States is measurably a less
free society than it was five or six years ago.1 292 With decisions like Calandra,
Leon, and now Garrison, this is certainly true today for a tenant in a multi-
unit structure whose neighbor is suspected by the police of criminal activity.
Teresa J. Verges
291. Sunderland, supra note 17, at 344.
292. Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "'Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HAST.
L.J. 889, 895 (1987).
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